November, 1939

RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Provable Claims Under Section 57j of the Bankruptcy Act-Trustee in bankruptcy claimed a credit of 90 per-cent. of
the taxes payable by the bankrupt corporation to the federal government
under the Social Security Act despite the fact that payment to the state
unemployment fund, upon which the credit was based, had not been made.'
Referee denied the credit whereupon trustee contested the finding, alleging
that denial of the credit was a penalty within the meaning of section 57J
of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 Held, that denial of the credit is not a penalty,
and the government's claim is allowable. it re Illinois Art Industries,
27 F. Supp. 334 (W. D. Mich. 1939).
Among the debts provable against a bankrupt corporation or individual are taxes owing to the federal, state, or local governments, 3 with the
restriction, imposed by section 57J of the Bankruptcy Act, 4 that the tax
claim must not be in the nature of a penalty.5 In holding that the credit
provisions of the Social Security Act 6 do not come within the purview
of section 57j, the court in the instant case relied principally on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.7

The

Supreme Court proceeded on the theory that the federal government can
collect the Social Security tax in full only where the taxpayer has made
no payment into a state fund; therefore the federal tax subjects the taxpayer to no greater a burden than would a state tax.8 This reasoning,
however, is only applicable where there is no state unemployment tax,
i."The tax-payer may credit against the tax imposed by section iioi of this chapter the amount of contributions . . . paid by him (before the date of filing his return

for the taxable year) into an unemployment fund under a State law. The total credit

allowed . . . shall not exceed 9o per centum of the tax against which itis credited. .. " 49 STAT. 639 (935), 42 U. S.C.A. § i1O2 (1938).
2."Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or a municipal-

ity as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with the reasonable and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest
as may have accrued thereon according to law." Bankruptcy Act, § 57J, 30 STAT. 561
(1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §93 (J)(1927).
3. Bankruptcy Act, ii U. S. C. A. § 64a (4) (927) ; United States v. Bernstein,
16 F. (2d) 233, 9 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 40 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); (1924) 37 Hav. L.
REv.380.

4. Supra note

2.

5. Interpreting section 57J, the courts have had little difficulty in disposing of gov-

erment claims which were obviously penalties: United States v. Birmingham Trust &
Savings Co., 258 Fed. 562, 43 Am. B. R. 430 (C.C.A. 5th, i91g), cert. denied,252 U. S.

550 (fine for criminal offense) ; In re Southern Steel Co., 183 Fed. 498, 25 Am. B. R.
358 (N. D. Ala. iio)
(fine for wrongful act) ; It re York Silk Manufacturing Co., i88
Fed. 735, 26 Am. B. R. 65o (M. D. Pa. 1911) (fine for failure to file capital stock
report).
Where the government's claim has been a levy for delinquent tax payment, the
courts have generally held that where the amount of the levy was within the legal rate
chargeable on the delinquent sum the claim was allowable: United States v. Childs, 266
U. S. 493 (2924); Horn v. Boone County, 44 F. (2d) 92o, 16 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 615
(C. C. A. 8th, 293o) ; (1925) 38 HARv.L. REV. 518; Note (936) 104 A. L. R. 884,
and cases there cited. But where the levy exceeded the legal rate, the claim was nonallowable as a penalty: New York v. Jersawit, 263 U. S. 493 (1924) ; In re Semon, ir
F. Supp. 18, 28 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 461 (D. C. Conn. 1935), aff'd, 8o F. (2d) 81 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935).
6. Supra note I.
7. 89 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), aff'd, 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
8. Id. at 21o.
(iii)
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for there the taxpayer is liable only for the federal tax. But where there
is a state unemployment tax which the bankrupt taxpayer has failed to
pay, that taxpayer is liable to both the state and federal levies. It would
seem, therefore, that at least in the latter case denial of the credit is a
penalty. But even assuming that the Supreme Court rightly held that denial of the credit is not a penalty, it does not follow that that holding is
determinative of the question raised in the instant case. The Steward
MHachine Co. case merely decided that the credit was a valid tax under
Article I, Section 8, clause i of the federal constitution. Whether or not
the levy is penalty within the meaning of section 571 of the Bankruptcy
Act is an entirely different question.9 The better considered opinion seems
to be that denial of the credit is such a penalty. 0 Denying the credit to
bankrupt corporations for failure to make timely payment to the state fund
forces those corporations to pay two unemployment taxes: one to the state,
and the other to the federal government. Such a result is what section
571 is designed to prevent." That section is intended to protect creditors
against having to pay extraordinary debts incurred by the bankrupt for
omitting to perform a legal duty. To hold, therefore, as the instant case
does, that a trustee in bankruptcy is not entitled to the 90 per-cent credit
where the bankrupt has failed to make timely payment of his state unemployment tax is to defeat the purpose of section 571 of the Bankruptcy
Act.

Constitutional Law-Validity of the Hare System of Proportional
Representation for the Election of City Councilmen-The Governor
of Rhode Island asked the opinion ' of the judges of the supreme court
as to the constitutionality of those sections of a bill, 2 providing a new charter for the city of Providence, which would introduce for the election of
city councilmen the Hare system of proportional representation, a form of
preferential voting whereby the elector has an effective vote for only one
candidate. Held (one justice dissenting), that the proposed method of
voting would be an infringement of the constitutional right to vote "in the
election of all civil officers". 3 Opinion to the Governor, 6 A. (2d) 147
(R. I. 1939).
9. "I am further of opinion that even if Steward Machine Co. v. Davis decided
that the credit provisions of title 9 of the Social Security Act do not constitute a penalty for purposes of constitutional law, that holding is not determinative of the question whether they constitute a penalty within the meaning of section 571 of the Bankruptcy Act." Tuttle, J., in In re Standard Composition Co., 23 F. Supp. 391, 394, 37
Am. B. R. (N. s.) 285, 290 (E. D. Mich. 1938).

Io. In re Standard Composition Co., 23 F. Supp. 39r, 37 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 285
(E. D. Mich. 1938) ; In. re Hy-Grade Meat & Grocery Co., 39 Am. B. R. (1N. s.) I9o
(D. C. N. J. 1938). Contra: In re Royal Wilhelm Furniture Co., 23 F. Supp. 993, 36
Am. B. R. (N. s.) 708 (W. D. Mich. 1938). In the Royal Wilhelm Furniture Co. case
the court held that the trustee in bankruptcy could not claim the credit where the bankrupt corporation had not paid the state tax, but in so holding made no attempt to define
penalty, nor did it even consider section 57i. In the instant case the court ignored the
previous decision in In re Standard Composition Co., although both of the cases were
decided in Michigan.
n. In re Standard Composition Co., 23 F. Supp. 391, 37 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 285
(E. D. Mich. 1938); COLLIER, BANKRUpTcY (IWth ed. 1923) I66.
i. R. I. CoNsT. amend. XII, § 2, requires the supreme court to give a "written
opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor."
2. S-64, §§ 35 to 56 and 66 to 68 (a bill to revise, consolidate and amend R. I.
Laws i866, c. 5_8).
3. R. I. CoNsT. amend. XX, § i.

RECENT CASES

Proportional representation 4 has made comparatively little headway
in America, 5 largely because of adverse judicial interpretation of state constitutions.' The principal legal objection to the Hare system is the supposed irreconcilability of its limited voting feature 7 with constitutional
provisions stipulating that every qualified voter is entitled to vote for all
officers. The decision in the instant case is in line with those of other jurisdictions which adhere to a literal interpretation of the constitutional provisions involved.8 Prima fade a constitution which states that a qualified
voter shall have the right to vote "in the election of all civil officers" does
prohibit a voting system allowing the elector* an effective vote for only
one candidate. As the dissenting opinion pointed out,9 however, the original constitutional provisions pertinent distinguished the qualifications enabling the elector to vote for all civil officers without exception from those
giving him the right to vote for general officers only. If a citizen satisfied
all the requirements, he might vote for all civil officers, but if he lacked
certain qualifications, he was not entitled to vote in the election of particular municipal officers,"0 the intent apparently being to distinguish between
citizens qualified to vote in the election of local as well as state officers
and those who might vote for state officers only. The distinction between
general and special qualifications was preserved in subsequent amend4. "An electoral arrangement designed to secure that the representative assembly

shall be an exact reflection, a 'snapshot', of the voting strength of parties among the
electorate." 18 ENCYC. BRITANNICA (I4th ed. 12g) 59o. Proportional representation

includes various electoral devices. Under a system of limited voting the elector is restricted to voting for a given number of candidates less than the number to be elected

from the district. Cumulative voting allows as many votes as there are candidates to

be elected, but the voter may concentrate them all on one candidate. The Hare plan,

sometimes called the "single transferable vote", is a variant of preferential voting. The

elector expresses first, second, third or additional choices, and by a process of transferring the ballots only one choice marked by the voter counts toward the election of
a candidate. In this respect the Hare system resembles limited voting. See Gosnell,
Proportional Representation (1937 ed.) 12 ENCYC. Soc. SCIENCES 541; McCRARY,
AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTION (4th ed. 1897) 212, n.; ENcYc. BRITANNICA, s11pra, at 590.

5. In Europe, and especially in Ireland, proportional representation has been much
more favorably received. See Gosnell, supra note 4, at 542.
6. The Hare system has been held unconstitutional in People ex rel. Devine v.
Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34 (1922) ; Wattles v. Upjohn et al., 211 Mich. 514,
179 N. W. 335 (1920). Its constitutionality was upheld in Johnson v. New York, 274
N. Y. 411, 9 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937) ; Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N. E.
27 (1923) (valid under a home rule amendment). Another form of preferential voting
was held unconstitutional in Brown v. Smallwood, 130 Minn. 492, 153 N. W. 953
(1915). Limited voting was judged unconstitutional in McArdle v. Mayor of Jersey
City, 66 N. J. L. 590, 49 Adt. 1013 (igoi); State v. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. 437
(1884) ; I) re Opinion of Judges, 21 R. I. 579, 41 At. lOO9 (1898). In Commonwealth
ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 33 Atl. 67 (1895) it was held constitutional.
Cumulative voting was held unconstitutional in Maynard v. Board of Canvassers, 84
Mich. 228, 47 N. W. 756 (i89o).
7. The Hare plan combines elements of limited and preferential voting. See note 4
supra.
8. People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34 (1922) ; Wattles
v. Upjohn et al., 211 Mich. 514, 179 N. W. 335 (1920).
9. See the partial dissent by Moss, P., in the instant case, at 156 and 157.
io. R. I. CoNsT. art. II, § i, provides that every citizen having certain qualifications and owning real estate of a particular value in a town or city "shall have a right
to vote in the election of all civil officers . . . ." If the real estate is outside of that
town or city, he shall "have a right to vote in the election of all general officers and
members of the general assembly" in the town or city of his residence. Art. II, § 2,
had the proviso that "no person shall at any time be allowed to vote in the election of
the city council of the city of Providence . . . unless he shall . . . have paid
a tax assessed upon his property therein . . . !"
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ments to the constitution and the original phraseology was retained.', Thus
the word "all", in the phrase "all civil officers", seems to mean all types
of civil officers, whether state or local, and not every candidate of a group
of candidates for the same office. Evidently the purpose of these provisions is to prescribe the qualifications sufficient for voting in the elections
of all kinds of civil officers rather than to secure any particular electoral
system." Since such an interpretation is reasonably possible, it is perhaps
to be regretted that the court decided as it did. As a device which may
lead to better government and a more interested electorate, proportional
representation at least deserves a test, even though its advantages may be
more theoretical than actual."

Corporations-Power of Corporation Under Reserved Right to
Amend Charter to Authorize Abolition of Accrued Dividends-Defendant corporation was organized under the Maryland statute,' which
specifically authorizes amendments changing the terms ' of outstanding
stock by holders of majority stock where there is adequate reservation in
the charter allowing such amendment. When originally issued, "A" stock
entitled shareholders to cumulative dividends. Complainant, a minority
stockholder (class "A") seeks to void an amendment passed by holders
of two-thirds of outstanding stock considered as a single class 3 calling
for issue of new shares abrogating dividends accrued on "A" stock. Held,
that the statute authorizes, the amendment, there being adequate reservation in the charter. 4 McQuillan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp.

639 (D. C. Md. 1939).

n. Art. VII, § I, of amendments, annulled art. II, § 2, but also had a proviso making additional qualifications necessary for voting for city council. This provision was
displaced by art. XX, § I, of amendments, which contains the phrase "shall have a right
to vote in the election of all civil officers" qualified by five provisos.
12. The New York Court of Appeals similarly construed the state constitution in
Johnson v. New York, 274 N. Y. 411, 9 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937), 37 COL. L. REV. 1424,
50 HARv. L. REV. 1314, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1192 (1938). N. Y. CoNsT. art. II, § I, provided: "Every citizen of the age of twenty-one years . . . shall be entitled to vote
: • . for all officers that now or hereafter may be elective by the people." The wording here would seem to be less favorable to proportional representation than that of the
Rhode Island provision.
13. Some of the advantages claimed for proportional representation are: (I)
diminishes number of wasted votes and thus stimulates interest in voting; (2) ensures

representation of minorities while at the same time enabling a popular majority to obtain a majority representation; (3) improves the quality of the candidates; (4) eliminates ward politics. Some of its supposed defects are: (I) it is so intricate that voters
are unable to understand it; (2) entails a long and complicated counting of votes; (3)
encourages voting along racial and religious lines; (4) prevents the election of a working majority. An ingenious argument against proportional representation is that it
defeats its own purpose by giving a declining political philosophy representation with
which to hamper a rising party based on progressive principles. See Orliffe, Proportional Representation? (Feb. 1938) 17 THE CANADIAN FORUM 388. See also Gosnell,
supra note 4, at 544; Robertson, Future of ParliamentaryDemocracy (Jan. 1938) 53
THE CONTEMPORARY REvIEw 15.
i. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 28.
2. "Terms" is defined in the above statute art. 23, § 28, as ". . . contract rights
of the holders thereof as expressed in the charter, . .
3. While there was a favorable vote by more than two-thirds of class "B" stockholders, such vote by class "A" stockholders did not exceed 62 per cent.
4- The court also upheld a further provision in the plan giving the president, in
consideration of past services, an option to buy at cost 5oooo shares of stock, purchased
and held by the corporation for this purpose.
The decision on this point is in accord with the majority view. Wright v. Heublein, 238 F. 321, 324 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916) (It is not the province of a court of equity

RECENT CASES

Courts have always looked with disfavor upon attempts by majority
stockholders to cancel accrued dividends. They have felt that a strong
inducement for purchasing cumulative preferred stock is the understanding
of the investor that in the event of failure to receive dividends currently,
they would nevertheless accumulate and ultimately be paid if available.' Judges have rationalized this attitude by variously describing the
right to accrued dividends as vested, a debt, 7 a right in the nature of a
debt," an existing claim," a prior charge on the net earnings, 1° a present
property interest postponable in its enjoyment but nonetheless assertable.11 Then, having enunciated the oft repeated doctrine that a corporate
charter in conjunction with the controlling statute constitutes a contract,
to which a person becomes a party upon buying stock,"2 the courts find in
most cases that there is nothing in either which permits the abrogation
of any right so "fundamental" as that to accrued dividends. 8 The instant
case and Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corporation4 furnish striking exto assume regulation of a corporation's internal affairs); Matthews v. Headly Choc.
Co., I3O Md. 523, 535, ioo At. 645, 65o (1917) (The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the directors as to what are proper salaries) ; Seitz v. Union Brass &
Metal Mfg. Co., I Minn. 46o, i89 N. W. 586 (1922) (Courts are loath to decide
whether salaries are excessive or not); see Dodd, Bonuses for Corporate Officials
(1918) 86 CENT. L. J. 2o8, 210 (Officers may be legally paid a percentage of net profits
realized by the company, but the amount must not be excessive).
The argument advanced for voiding the option was that the compensation as provided was excessive for, when exercised, the stock had increased greatly in value. In
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582 (1932), 45 Y= L. J. 419 (i933), the court said that
where the amounts payable depend on the success of the business, a bonus of a percentage of corporate profits is not per se unreasonable. In that case the compensation
was so large that the court held it resulted in the spoliation of the corporation. That
case has no application to the principal case because here the stock option was part of
the salary; also there was no spoliation of company property since the company lost
nothing by the transaction. As there is nothing in the controlling statute [MD. ANN.
CODE (Bagby, r924) art. 231 or the company's charter to prohibit such action, the decision is a correct one.
5. Keller v. Wilson, igo Atl. 115, 124 (Del. Ch. 1936); General Investment Co. v.
Amer. Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 339, 129 Atl. 244, 249 (925) ; Roberts v.
Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 263, 77 N. E. 13, i5 (i9o6).
6. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. C. R. I. 1929);
Morris v. Amer. Publ. Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136 (Ch. 1923), 122 Atl. 696; Lonsdale
Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 139
Atl. 50 (0927).
7. Morris v. Amer. Publ. Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136 (Ch. 1923), i22 AtI. 696;
see Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 264, 77 N. E. i3, I5 (1906).
8. Keller v. Wilson, i9o Atl. II5 (Del. Ch. i936); Morris v. Amer. Publ. Utilities
Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136 (Ch. 1923), i2 Atl. 696.

9. Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., ioi N. J.
Eq. 554, 139 At. 50 01927).
io. Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 96, 67 Adt. 657, 667 (907).
II. Morris v'. Amer. Publ. Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136 (Ch. 1923), 122 At. 696.
The use of such terms adds little to any understanding of the situation, since whether
a right is to be properly termed "vested" depends entirely upon the ultimate holding of
the court. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932) 268, 269.

12. Keller v. Wilson, x9o At. 115 (Del. Ch. 1936); Morris v. Amer. Publ. Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136 (Ch. 1923), 122 Atl. 696.
13. Havender v. Federal United Corp., 6 A. (2d) 618 (Del. Ch. 1939) ; Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. Ch. 1937) ; Keller v. Wilson, 19o
At. 115 (Del. Ch. 1936); Morris v. Amer. Publ. Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136
(Ch. 1923), 122 At. 696; Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine

Co., ior N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At. 50 (1927) ; General Investment Co. v. Amer. Hide &
Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 At. 244 (1925) ; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184
N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. I3; see Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533
542 (D. C. R. I. 1929), 43 H.Av. L. REV. 656 (1930). Contra: Harr v. Pioneer
Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
14. 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
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amples of courts which have not felt bound by the feeling of reverence
which has always been shown towards accrued dividends. Both opinions
justify the result reached by pointing to the very broad statute "5 and
charter '" in force, with the conclusion that the investor agreed to the possibility of this event when he bought the stock. It is an unalterable fact,
however, that the words" "cumulative preferred stock" have acquired
through long usage such a well recognized meaning in the mind of the
average investor, that courts should hesitate to adopt a construction which
will permit a minority stockholder to be deprived of his "rights" by the
majority, except in cases where the charter and the statute are so unambiguous in their terms as to permit of no other construction, and only then
in situations where such a modification of rights are urgently required for
the corporate well being.'
The holding in the instant case, though legally
sound, might have been otherwise if the plaintiff has brought a timely
action,
instead of sleeping on his rights for two years after the reorganiza8
tion.

International Law-Effect of Russian Confiscatory Decrees on

American Assets of Russian Company After Recognition-Defendant
Insurance Company of Russia, though terminated in the nation of its origin
by Soviet decrees in 1918 and i919 which confiscated insurance company
property to the state,' continued to conduct an American branch business
until 1925 when New York state authorities liquidated its assets and paid
all American policyholders and creditors. Following recognition in 1933
by the United States Government, Soviet Russia assigned its claim to
American assets to the United States, and the latter asserted the claim in
a suit by foreign creditors for payment out of the surplus. Held (three
judges dissenting), that the Soviet decrees did not operate to give the Russian Government nor its assignee the right to surplus assets; and the court
order holding the money in trust for foreign claimants was confirmed.
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 280 N. Y.
286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939) .
15. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 28.
16. Art. 7, company charter, at p. 645, instant case. See Note (1937) 1 MD. L.
REv. 254, anticipating this decision.
17. "In England where amendments in the articles for a long time have by statutory authorization been made by the majority of the shareholders, there are clear holdings that any intended changes in the members' rights vested by the creation of shares,
requires a justification on the grounds of a corporate purpose." Note (1928) U. oF
PA. L. REV. 256, 265, cases cited in footnote 38. In Windhurst v. Central Leather Co.,
IoI N. J. Eq. 543, 547, 138 Atl. 772, 774 (1927) the right to accrued dividends is questioned where the corporation is in such bad condition that failure to modify such rights
would have been disastrous. That the policy of modem legislation favors corporate
reorganization to preserve the shareholders' capital investments is shown by the
Amendment to the Nat'l Bankruptcy Act (§ 77B), Act of June 7, 1934, c. 424, 48 STAT.
912; II U. S. C. A. § 207.
I8. The court was probably influenced by the fact that complainant, instead of immediately seeking an injunction, slept on his rights two years. The reluctance of a
court to disturb a vast reorganization, which affects the rights of thousands of persons
can well be appreciated. See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N. J. Eq. 543, 548,
138 AtI. 772, 775. An equitable solution in this case would be to award damages.
i. For terms of the decrees, see instant case at 305, 20 N. E. (2d) at 765.
2. For problems arising before recognition see articles by Barry, Russian Insurance
Funds-The Problem of Their Distribution (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 243; and Untermeyer, Judicial Interpretation of the Soviet Decrees in Relation to Private Rights
(1933)

I GEO. WASH.

L. REv.

471.
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While existing principles of international law are frequently ignored,
they are very real, and political expediency dictates the advisability of
adhering to them." The determination of the Court of Appeals to favor
instead the public policy of the state is not in accord with United States
Supreme Court precedent 4 and not consistent with the language of earlier cases decided by the instant court." Generally, recognition of a government involves giving effect retroactively to all acts of that government
from the beginning of its regime, 6 and it would' seem that this is so whether
the recognition be of a de facto or de jure government.7 Every pertinent
act of the Soviet Government from the beginning should therefore be
given full force, except for the fact that both international law and public
expediency permit American nationals to assert their claims.9 Beyond
our own nationals, the authority of our courts is limited to turn over the
surplus, under proper safeguards, to the parent corporation, its successor,
or its representative in the foreign jurisdiction.' 0 Under the Soviet decrees,
the Russian Government became the successor to all insurance companies
and the substantive right to the assets vested in it;"1 and this right that
government has effectively 2 assigned to the United States. To hold otherwise, the court in the instant case invoked the questionable fiction of treating the American branch of the insurance company as a complete and
separate organization subject to normal state insurance law as other do3. See DicKmsoN, THE LAw OF NATIoNs (1929) 1-75.
4. In United States v. Belmont, 3o1 U. S. 324 (1937) the Supreme Court reversed

a judgment dismissing an action by the United States as assignee of the Russian Government to recover money deposited in a United States bank by a Russian Corporation,
the assets of which had been appropriated by the Russian Government. Cf. Canada
Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, l09 U. S. 527 (1883) ; Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U. S. 468
(1937) ; The Navemar, 102 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; see United States v. Bank
of New York and Trust Co., 77 F. (2d) 866, 868 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
5. In In re Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 242 N. Y. 148, 51 N. E. 159 (1926) the court

said that only American citizens who dealt with the United States branch were entitled
to the protection of the statute and to share in the distribution made thereunder. The
same court went on to say in In re People, Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 249 N. Y. 139, 163
N. E. 129 (1928) that all other creditors (foreign) may share only in the distribution
of assets of the foreign liquidators, appointed in the jurisdiction where the corporation
is domiciled, to whom the superintendent of insurance must transmit any surplus of the
funds remaining in his charge after the payment to those creditors who are entitled to
payment therefrom. These two cases concerned American branches of Norvegian
companies. The recognition of Russia would seem to remove any objection to following the same course in the case of Russian corporations.
6. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186 (1877) ; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U. S. 250, 253 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302 (1918);
United States v. Bank of New York, 77 F. (2d) 866, 868 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 85, 193 N. E. 877, 901 (934).
7. Note (922) 35 HA~v. L. REv. 6o7; see Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 185
(1877) ; Luther v. Sagor, (1921) 3 K. B. 532, 551.
8. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (193I);
see United States Bank of New York, 77 F. (2d) 866, 868 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
9. See Matter of People, by Stoddard (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148,
167, 151 N. E. i59, 165 (1926) ; United States v. President & Directors of the Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 406, 12 N. E. (2d) 518, 523 (1938).
io. In re Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. I59 (1926) ; It re People,
Norske Lloyd Ins. Co., 249 N. Y. 139, 163 N. E. 129 (1928) ; see Matter of People, by
Beha v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N. Y. 415, 427, 175 N. E. 114, ii8 (93)
; Matter of People, by Beha v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 177, I8I, 176 N. E. 133,
134 (1931.
ii. United States v. Belmont, 3O U. S. 324 (1937) ; United States v. President
& Directors of the Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 12 N. E. (2d) 518 (1938); see
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 77 F. (2d) 866, 868 (C. C. A. 2(d,

1935).
12. Cases cited note ii supra.

118

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

mestic corporations."3 The Russian decrees, it was said, would not alter
the situation even if intended to have extraterritorial effect since it would
be contrary to the policy of the forum to give such decrees that effect."4
Such reasoning ignores the fact that the insurance law of New York was

only intended to protect American creditors and policyholders, 15 and that
the present litigation concerns only foreign creditors whose claims did not
arise through dealings with the American branch. It is at least questionable, in a case where the rights of American nationals are not concerned,
whether public policy would dictate holding the assets of a foreign corporation for distribution to foreign creditors rather than returning the assets
to the government of the corporation's origin that foreign creditors may
present their claims in a jurisdiction of the company's own nationality."
That the Soviet Government has abolished all rights of such creditors
should not concern American courts, however much personal considerations
may lead individuals to feel sympathetic toward alien claimants. Moreover, recognition of a foreign government, which carries with it recogni.
tion of the acts, laws, and decrees of that government should be binding
on the judges.' 7 It would seem that the court's natural antipathy toward
enforcing decrees alien to American concepts of government has led them
to establish a precedent in international law that might possibly prove

politically embarrassing.
Labor Law-Invalidity of Anti-Picketing Ordinance Under Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment-A municipal ordinance,' intended to prevent obstruction of public ways, intimidation and
violence in labor disputes, and to assure the public freedom from annoyance, prohibited picketing except by a majority of employees of at least
thirty days standing.2 Held, that the ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the classification of
those allowed and not allowed to picket is unreasonable.3 People v. Gidaly,
7 U. S. L. WEEK 150 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1939).
13. Instant case at 309, 20 N. E. (2d) at 767; see It-re Stoddard, Norske Lloyd
Ins. Co., 242 N. Y. 148, 159, 151 N. E. 159, 162 (1926).
14. Instant case at 309, 2o N. E. (2d) at 766.
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by soveriegn
powers as between themselves. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 253 (1897) ;
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 303 (1918). Claims originating in an
alien country, through contracts between aliens, are foreign claims not entitled to distribution made by the superintendent of insurance. Matter of People, by Beha, Second
Russian Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 177, 181, 176 N. E. 133, 134.
17. See Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212 (890); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302 (i918) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S.
126, 137 (1938).
I. Los Angeles City Ordinance No. 8017o, adopted Sept. 16, 1938; (3938) 3 L. R.
Rm'. MAN. 846; Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1521; N. Y. Times, Sept. ig, 1938, § i,
p. I, col. 3-4.
2. In more explicit terms, the ordinance prohibited picketing except in furtherance
of a "bona fide strike" and by "bona fide employees". "Bona fide strike" is defined as
a strike of at least a majority of the "bona fide employees" of all classes of an employer
called for the purpose of obtaining or resisting a change in wages, hours or conditions
of employment after a majority of all the employees have voted by secret ballot to
strike. "Bona fide employees" are defined as employees who have been employed consistently by an employer for a period of not less than thirty days.
3. For interpretation of other sections of the ordinance, see People v. Tilkin, 3 Cal.
Supp. 83,.go P. (2d) 148 (1939).
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Failure of state courts to curb picketing activity to the satisfaction of
anti-laborists I has led to the passage of numerous anti-picketing ordinances
in recent years,5 such regulation usually being upheld under the police
power.' The instant ordinance, the most drastic of any reported, is the
first to be successfully attacked on the ground of class legislation.7 Classification by a legislature is permitted by the equal protection clause if not
unreasonable or arbitrary, the test being whether it substantially advances
the legislative objectives sought.8 All persons within a given class must
be treated alike. 9 In the light of these standards, the holding that the
basis of classification used is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment
seems sound. Whether or not a picket has been employed for thirty days
can in no way affect the public through violence or obstruction of the
streets. An employee of a month's standing is hardly less likely to offend
than one employed only a week. Similarly, denying the privilege to a
minority while granting it to a majority is unrelated to the preservation
of the public peace. In fact, prohibiting picketing by a majority, rather
than a minority, would seem to further to a greater extent the ends sought,
for there would then be fewer agitators on the street. Applying the test
4. See Local Union No. 26, Nat. Bro. of Op. Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 82,
5 N. E. (2d) 624, 628 (1937) ; Hellerstein, Picketing Legislationand the Courts (1932)
1o N. C. L.

REv. 158, 173; Legis. (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV. 152r1, 1527; (1938) 48 YALE
L. J. 308; (937) 6 I. J. A. BuLu. 44, 45; Note (1937) io6 A. L. R. 361. But see
Hellerstein, supra, at 174; Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 MIcM.
L. Rav. 73; (1938) 3 L. R. REP. 331.
s. See cases cited note 6 infra; (1934) 2 I. J.A. BuLL. No. 12, p. 3; (1939) 3 L.
R. REF. MAN. 849; N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1937,
p. 6, col. 5-6. But see (937) 5 I. J. A.

BuLL. 117.

6. Ferguson v. Peake, 18 F. (2d) 166 (App. D. C. 192); In the Matter of WilPac. 1035 (1gio) ; People v. Sargent, 6 I. J. A. BuLL. 44 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1937); Whitney v. Lydick, 3 L. R. REF. MAN. 810 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938) ;
In re Gladstein, 4 L. R. REP. 11o (Cal. Super. Ct. 1939) ; Watters v. Indianapolis, 191
liams, 158 Cal. 55o, ii

Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482

(1922)

; Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 55o

overruled because of subsequent passage of conflicting statute, Local Union
No. 26, Nat. Bro. of Op. Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (I937) ;
International L. G. W. U. v. Westminster, i-A L. R. REV. MAN. 684 (Md. C. C. 1937);
Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384, 14 N. E.45r (888) ; Ex parte Stout, 82
Te. Cr. R. 183, 1g8 S. W. 967 (1917); Adams v. Walla Walla, 2 L. R. REP. 16y
(Wash. Super. Ct. 1938), rev'd on other grounds,.82 P. (2d) 584 (1938); see State
ex rel. Nield v. Kimble, i-A L. R. REF. MAN. 682, 684 (Md. C. C. 1937) ; Hall v.
Johnson, 87 Ore. 21, 31, 169 Pac. 515, 518 (1917). Contra: Terre Haute v. Lentz, 5
I. J. A. BULL. 74 (Ind. C. C. 1936), Local Union No. 26, Nat. Bro. of Op. Potters v.
Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (1937), Ex parte Sweitzer, 13 Okla. Cr. R.
154, 162 Pac. 1134 (917) (statutory conflicts) ; People v. Young, 2 L. R. RFP. 59o
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1938), People v. Watson, 4 L. R. REP. 789 (Cal. Super.
1939),
People v. Meyers, 2 I. J. A. BussL. No. 9; P. 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1934), St.Ct.Louis
v.
Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (19o8) (unconstitutional) ; In the Matter of Harder, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 153, 49 P. (2d) 304 (I935), People v. Duncan, 5 I. J. A. BULL.
75 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1936) (void on the ground of indefiniteness as to what constituted
the prohibited act).
(1924),

7. In Adams v. Walla Walla, cited note 6 supra, in answer to the argument of unreasonable discrimination, the court said: "The ordinance here affects all employees

that were employed in the particular establishment where the strike existed in the same

manner; it affects all employers in the same manner . . .".and therefore the ordinance was not unconstitutional on the ground that it was class legislation and that the
classification which it made was unreasonable and unjust, thereby denying the unions
equal protection of the law. (1938) 2 L. R. REP. 16. See also Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 450, 145 N. E. 550, 553 (1924), cited note 6 supra.
8. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 32 (1884) ; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165
U. S. 150, 155 (1897) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (191o) ;
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (ig2o) ; Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 337 (1921).
q. Ibid.
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used in Adams v. Walla Walla,"° it is clear that the ordinance does not
affect all employees within a particular establishment where the strike exists in the same manner. For example, a single craft representing a minority of the workers in a large concern would be denied the right of
effectuating their strike by picketing, whereas a craft embracing a majority
of workers would be permitted to exercise this privilege. The unfairness
of such a situation is obvious. On the other hand, it is admitted that the
ordinance touched a legitimate sphere of regulation, for the privilege of
picketing easily becories the burden of abuse." Thus a discrimination
between employees and non-employees might well be justified, since the
likelihood of violence would be lessened by the exclusion of union sympathizers and professional "strong arm men". But to keep an ordinance
within this sphere, it is apparent that the legislatures must carefully observe the distinction between regulation and suppression.
Taxation-Double Taxation of Intangibles-Decedent domiciled
in Tennessee set up a trust in Alabama consisting of intangibles, with power
in herself to dispose of the corpus by will, which power she exercised.
Held (four justices dissenting), that both Tennessee and Alabama could
impose death taxes on the property so held. Curry v. McCanless, 6 U. S.
L. WEEK 1413 (U. S. 1939). Accord, Graves v. Elliott, 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 1418 (U. S. 1939).'
A New Jersey stock fire insurance company maintained an office to
carry on local business as required by law; the executive offices were in
New York, where all its assets were kept and its principal business transacted; New Jersey levied a tax on the full amount of its capital stock paid
in and accumulated surplus. Held, that the tax by New Jersey was valid.
Newark Fire Insurance Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 1422 (U. S. 1939).
These decisions once again open up the field of double taxation to
uncertainty and speculation, and since they have been handed down by a
Court greatly changed in personnel, it is necessary to examine them carefully in the light of prior decisions in order to appreciate their significance.
That double taxation of intangibles was allowed very generally during the
years up to 1930 is evidenced by a long line of cases.2 During those years
the Supreme Court adopted the benefit theory of taxation in order to justify taxes by two states on the same intangibles.3 It was sufficient to show
that the state had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and this was done
in a variety of ways. 4 It was inevitable that double taxation should result,
and it was admitted that the power of two states to tax on different and
Io. 2 L. R. REP. 161 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 82 P. (2d)
584 (1938), cited note 7 suPra.
ii. ". . . the vote [passing the instant ordinance] is a significant sign of public
revulsion against some of the flagrant picketing abuses of the last few years." N. Y.
Times, Sept. 19, 1938, p. 18, col. 2.
i. Decedent set up a trust in Colorado and later moved to New York, where he
retained control of the trust. Held (four justices dissenting), that both New York and
Colorado could impose death taxes on the property in trust.
2. Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730 (903); Wright v. Louisville & Nashville R.
R., 195 U. S. 219 (2904) ; Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U. S. 390 (1912) ; Hawley v. City
of Malden, 232 U. S. I (914); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S.
54 (1917) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325 (1920);

Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99
U. S. 88 (1923).

(1921);

Schwab v. Richardson, 263

3. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, I99 U. S. 194, 202 (1905);
see also Merrill, .urisdiction To Tax-Another Word (i935) 44 YALE L. J. 582, 585-6.
4. On the basis of mobilia sequunur personam the state of the owner's domicile
could tax. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, ioo U. S. 491 (1879); on the basis of "business
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more or less inconsistent principles led to some hardship, but it was held
that these inconsistencies violated no rule of constitutional law. The decisions handed down in 193o and 1932 were therefore received with some

surprise. 6 Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Minnesota 7 repudiated the right
of the state of the debtor's domicile to levy a death transfer tax on intangibles held in another state by the decedent creditor, and in the same year
this was extended to the situation where the evidences of the intangibles
were physically in the debtor's state.8 In 1932 the Court denied the power
of the state of incorporation to levy a death transfer tax on stock owned
by a non-resident.9 To that extent, decedents' estates were protected from
double taxation, but in arriving at this conclusion, the Court was forced
to attribute a fictional situs to intangibles which actually could have no situs
at all. ° However, it was then believed that this policy would have a much
wider application,"' but such has not proved to be the case. In contrast
to the limitations that were laid down in the inheritance tax cases, no
such policy was followed in the income or property taxes. In Lawrence
v. State Tax Commission 2 and in the decisions that followed '3 it was held
that a state could tax a resideit upon income derived from business carried
on elsewhere, and which was presumably taxable in the other jurisdiction." In 1936 ' the Court held valid a West Virginia ad valorem property tax on accounts receivable and bank deposits owned by a Delaware
corporation, but which were held to have acquired a business situs in'West
Virginia. Although the point did not come up in that case, these intangibles would probably be taxable in Delaware also.'8 This was the most
extreme application of the business situs doctrine,'17 but it was followed
by two others that allowed double property taxes.' s It is necessary to
determine therefore what new development, if any, is shown by these instant cases. In Curry v. McCanless, after citing the FarmersLoan case,"
and those that followed, with approval, the Court dearly states that their
scope will not now be extended. Therefore instead of denying the right
of Tennessee to tax, as would be in accord with those cases and as advocated by the four dissenting justices, the majority invoked the benefit theory
once again and did not attempt to attribute a single situs to the intangibles
situs", the state where the business was carried on could tax. Bristol v. Washington
County, 177 U. S. i33 (igoo) ; and on the basis of giving legal effect to a debt, the
state of the debtor's domicile could tax. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. I89 (1903).
5. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (19o3).
6. Merrill, Jurisdiction To Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YAIE L. J. 582, and
articles cited there in note 2.
7. 280 U. S.204 (1930).
8. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (193o); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, 282 U. S. I (930).
9.First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
io. Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
it. "The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one state . . . is broader
than the application thus far made of it." Mr. Justice Sutherland in First National
Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
12. 286 U. S.276 (1932).
13. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (937)

; Guaranty Trust Co.

v. Virginia, 305 U. S.i9 (1938).
14. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S.37 (1920) ; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U. S. 6o (192o); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S.113 (1920);
Atlantic Coast Line R IL v. Doughton, 262 U. S.413 (1923) ; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
i5.Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S.193 (1936).
16. On the authority of Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S.
325 (920), which has never been overruled.
17. See (t936) 85 U. oF PA. L. REV. 121.
I8. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S.234 (i937); Schuylkill Trust
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 5o6 (i938).
19. 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
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(which would normally be the domicile of the trustee). Furthermore, the
reason for allowing the Tennessee tax is strongly attacked by the minority,"
and the inference is that the decision was influenced to a large degree by
policy. It is submitted that this policy is in line with that followed in
the other recent decisions, and indicates a reluctance on the part of the
Court to return to the "one thing, one tax" idea. In the Newark Fire Insurance case, four of the justices, led by Mr. Justice Reed, very carefully
considered the possibility of a business situs for the intangibles in New
York, and when it was found that none existed, the New Jersey tax was
upheld. The reason for this is not clear. Since the Cream of Wheat case 21
was decided in 192o, the power of a state to tax a domestic corporation on
intangible assets employed in other states has been generally conceded,
but the exact point has not come up since Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Minnesota 22 was decided. The point was reserved in that case and in the
ones that followed. Although Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox25 usually stands
for double taxation, the exact point did not arise there. Double taxation
was upheld in the First Bank Stock Corp. case, 4 but the power of Delaware, the state of incorporation, was not in issue. Schuylkill Trust Co. v.
Pennsylvania 25 also allowed a double property tax, but there a Pennsylvania tax on shares of stock in a Pennsylvania corporation was sustained.
Therefore the question was still open when the Newark Fire Insurance
case was decided. The other four justices (Mr. Justice McReynolds did
not vote) did not discuss the business situs problem, but upheld the New
Jersey tax on the authority of the Cream of Wheat case. That would indicate that that case was still ruling, but what the final outcome will be is
difficult to predict. Two factors seem to be important-business situs in
another state, and the amount of business carried on in the state of incorporation. If such a business situs were found to exist, and the amount
of business carried on in the state of incorporation were negligible, then
it might result in a denial of the latter's right to tax. However, it is submitted that those members of the Court that concurred with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter may be able to carry the problem to a solution that is in
accord with the policy followed in Curry v. McCanless and a fortiori permitting double taxation.
Torts-Liability of Broadcasting Company for Extemporaneous
Defamation by One Not Its Employee-Defendant, a broadcasting
company, leased its facilities to a commercial advertising company for a
series of sponsored programs. The principal performer, an employee of
the advertising company, deviated from the rehearsed script and made
an extemporaneous remark concerning plaintiff, a hotel. Plaintiff brought
an action of trespass for defamation. Held, that, conceding the remark
to have been defamatory, 1 defendant was not liable in the absence of any
negligence on its part. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, September II, 1939, p. I, col. I.
2o. "...
at the time of her death, (the testatrix) had no estate or interest in the
securities held by the trustee." Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting.
21. Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325
22. 280 U.

(2920).

S. 204 (1930).

23. 298 U. S. 193 (1936).
24. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 3Ol U. S. 234 (1937).
25. 302 U. S. 5o6 (1938).
I. The decision contains some discussion but no holding on the question of whether
the rules of libel or of slander should be used to determine whether specific broadcasted
utterances are defamatory. See S. DAvis, THE LAW OF RADIO COMIUNICATION (1927)
158; 2 SOCOLow, LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING (1939)
REV. 312; (1932) 46 HAuRv. L. REv. 133.

848-852; (1938)

86 U. OF PA. L.
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The court considered that the instant case presented a novel problem,
since defamation by radio is not strictly analogous to any other type of
defamation. It laid down a standard of "due care" as the one which
would best balance the conflicting interests of the parties. Previous cases
involving the liability of a broadcasting company for defamation' have
followed the analogy of publication of a libel by a newspaper 3 and have
held the company a joint publisher 4 with absolute liability according to
the rule of Peck v.Tribune Co.' However the instant case is the first in
any appellate court of the United States where the factor of an unforeseeable extemporaneous departure from the script has been present.'
Numerous writers 7 have contended that the newspaper analogy would
be inappropriate in the event of "ad libbing" because the broadcaster is
unable to delete a remark suddenly interjected, whereas a newspaper has
complete control over the exact text distributed to the public. This argument would be of great weight if the basis for liability in defamation were
negligence; but it does not seem very substantial in jurisdictions where
there is liability without fault for publication of defamation. The law of
defamation looks to the fact of publication rather than to any fault or lack
of fault in the publisher; 1 therefore the fact that the radio station was
actively engaged in publishing whatever words the speaker uttered 9 should
fix its liability regardless of whether it had an opportunity to prevent particular words from being spoken. A newspaper which published notice
of the birth of twins to a couple who, unknown to the publisher, had been
married only two months was held liable for defamation although there
was no negligence on its part."0 To apply a rule of absolute liability under
2. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934) ; Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) ; Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172
Wash. 466, 20 Pac. (2d) 847 (1933); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 Pac. (2d) 1127
(1938).
3. Several other analogies have been suggested. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts
(1937) 5o HARv. L. REV. 725, 731, for the suggestion that a broadcasting company be
considered as merely having furnished the mechanism by which the defamation was
published and liable therefore only for intentional wrongdoing or lack of due care.
Ibid. and Nash, Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to Radio Broadcasting
(1938) 17 ORE. L. REv. 307, 311, for suggestion that the broadcaster be considered
analogous to a book-seller; such republisher "is liable as though the dissemination
were an original publication by him, unless he has no reason to know of its defamatory
character". RESTATEMENT, ToRTS (938)
§ 581. Other possible analogies are to a
telephone or telegraph company. The court in the instant case rejected all argument
from analogy; and, though the opinion is not clear on this point, it seemed to regard
the radio station as an original publisher rather than a republisher.
4- An excellent discussion of why broadcasting stations should be considered "original joint publishers" will be found in Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by
Radio (1935) 19 MINN. L. REV. 61I.
5. 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554 (19o9) ; Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac.
392 (895)
; Jones v. Hulton, L. R. (igog) 2 K. B. 444, (1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. REV.
365 and 461. Contra: Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 34 N. E. 462
(1893).
6. In Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932), a copy of the speech
was available, but was not in fact examined by the defendant; in Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 Pac. (2d) 847 (1933) a prepared manuscript was submitted to and read by one of the station's announcers; in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting
Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934) the defamatory utterance was a part of a rehearsed script for a program originating in another studio.
7. 2 SOCOLOW, op. cit. supra note 1,at 855; S. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 1,at 164;
Report of Standing Committee on Communications (1932) 57 A. B. A. REP. 423, 447.
8. In Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. i85, i89, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 555 (I9)
Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As
was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he publishes
at his peril'."
9. Void, note 4 supra.
10. Morrison v. Ritchie, 39 Scottish L. R. 432 (1902).

124

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

the facts of the instant case seems no more harsh. It is true that the courts
should not feel bound to extend old rules slavishly into the new tort of
radio defamation; some of the distinctions between libel and slander are

clearly inapplicable, 1 and public interest demands liberal creation of qualified privilege to broadcast political and educational programs. 2 But
where the defendant while engaged in a purely commercial enterprise on
an unprivileged occasion has injured the plaintiff, the resulting loss should
be borne by the broadcaster, the active agent who is in a position to shift
the loss,' 3 rather than by the passive victim. In most jurisdictions that
result would be reached by adherence to the established rules of defamation.'
However, it is not surprising that the instant court should have
reached the result it did, as the opinion was greatly influenced by the
general reluctance of the Pennsylvania courts to impose absolute liability "I
and by the supposition that Pennsylvania would not hold a newspaper
liable for defamation unless it knew or should have known that published
statements were in fact defamatory."
Trusts-Attachment of Interest of Trustee-Beneficiary of
Spendthrift Trust for Loss Occasioned by Breach of Trust-A surety
paid the trust estate for loss caused by breach of trust by the trustee of a
spendthrift trust who was also a beneficiary, and now, as assignee of the
trust estate, seeks to attach the defaulting trustee's income ' from the trust
in the hands of the substituted trustee. Held, that the present trustee
should pay the trustee-beneficiary her income without any deduction for
the breach, because the spendthrift trust cannot be reached by the surety
who is no more than an ordinary creditor. Blakemore v. Jones et al.,
22 N. E. (2d)
112 (Mass. 1939).

The instant decision represents a rejection of the recent and growing
tendency to allow claimants with especially strong equities to attach the
beneficiary's income from a spendthrift trust.' Hitherto the strictness
ii. Supra note i.

12. In Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 6I, 74 Pac. (2d) i127 (1938) it was held that
the speaker's privilege extended to the broadcasting company. In the case of addresses
by public officials, round table discussions, political speeches, etc., it would be possible
to grant the radio station a broader privilege than the speaker or a privilege where
none existed for the speaker.
13. Broadcasters may take indemnifying agreements to protect them against loss.
See (1938) 9 AIR L. REV. 328, 350. In fact, defendant in the instant case took such an
agreement from the advertising company.
14. Supra note 5.

15. The opinion contains a very complete discussion of this aspect of Pennsylvania
decisions.
I6. There seems to be no Pennsylvania decision directly in point. The court in the
instant opinion quotes dicta from Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346, 351, 53
At. 237, 238 (I9O2) and Shelly v. Dampman, i Pa. Super. 115, 123 (896), as indicating a standard of strict care rather than absolute liability. But both these dicta
actually concern loss of a qualified privilege.
i. Under the facts of the case, it was the default of a co-trustee that was involved.
2. See i BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 223, pp. 727-730; GRIswoLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936)

289-362.

The validity of this trust device is based on the policy of the law allowing an
owner of property to dispose of it as he desires. See I BOGERT, op. cit. supra at 722;
(1933) 8r U. oF PA. L. REV. 48o. For a comprehensive compilation of cases concerning the validity of the spendthrift trust, see GRIswoLD, op. cit. supra, C. 2. As to its
validity where the trustee is also beneficiary, see id. § 283. For a study of the older
cases and the development of the law on spendthrift trusts, see Runk, American Statutory Modifications of the Rule Against Perpetuities,of Trusts for Accumulation and of
Spendthrift Trusts (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 397, 405.

RECENT CASES
of this trust device has not been relaxed 3 except in certain situations I
where unusually meritorious creditors have been favored, as for example,
the beneficiary's wife 5 and children 6 claiming support, and persons who
furnish the cestui que trust with necessities.
Although some courts rationalize these instances by extending the terms of the trust,8 it is more
logical to treat them as exceptions to the general rule.9 In refusing to
add the instant case to the exceptions already recognized,10 the Massachusetts court considered the trust estate as an ordinary creditor and as
such, prohibited from reaching the trust funds under the general spendthrift provision. 1
The Restatement of Trusts takes the opposite position, 12 proposing to allow the beneficiary's claim even though general creditors have been barred. The distinction is valid. The ordinary creditor
has complete discretion in extending credit to a trustee-beneficiary, and
cannot justifiably rely on the trust income for payment of the claim., 3 On
the other hand, a beneficiary has no voice in the selection of a trustee.
Accordingly, his plea for a preferred position in case of the trustee's de3. See (933)

81 U. OF PA. L. REv. loog.

4. See I Bo.RT, loc. cit. supra note 2; GRISWOLD, loc. cit. supra note 2.
5. In re Yard's Estate, I16 Misc. 19, 189 N. Y. Supp. i9o (Surr. Ct. 1921); In re
Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 At. 8o2 (1927), (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Ray.
220, 41 HARV. L. REV. 409. Contra: San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis,
121 Cal. App. 675, IO P. (2d) 158 (1932), criticized in Turrentine, Suggestions for
Revision of Provisions of the California Civil Code Regarding Future Interests (1932)
21 CA IF. L. REv. i, 23-24; see also Note (932)
21 CALIF. L. REv. 142, 150. GRISWOLD,
op. Cit. supra note 2, at 297, labels this case "a minority view which loses sight of the
fact that spendthrift trusts find their basis only in a public policy which is certainly no
stronger than the policy supporting the elemental obligation of support". See also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 157.
6. See Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 236, 218, 132 Atl. io, 11 (1926) (support for child
even after divorce) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 157. Two states have legislation
on this matter: I Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 569 (income of beneficiary made reachable
for support of wife or children or alimony) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 393o) tit. 2o,

2143.

7. See Sherman v. Skuse, 166 N. Y. 345, 59 N. E. 99o (igoi) (charge for physician's services to beneficiary where trust was to be applied to beneficiary's benefit) ;
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 157.
Other illustrations are: Claims for alimony:
England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922) ; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N. Y. 520,
44 N. E. I69 (1896); Fink v. Fink, 139 Misc. 630, 248 N. Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct.
I931) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 127 Pa. Super. 567, 193 Atl. 86o (937) ; RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (I935) § 157. Contra: Erickson v. Erickson, I97 Minn. 71, 266 N. W. I6i
(3936) ; Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 At. 433 (924).
State's claim for support of an insane beneficiary: In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343, 192 Atl. 397 (I937). Debts
due the settlor of the estate: In re Cramer's Estate, 366 Misc. 713, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
75 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Contra: In re Edward's Estate, 217 Cal. 25, 17 P. (2d) 116
(1932) ; Matter of Bogert's Estate, 41 Misc. 598, 85 N. Y. Supp. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
The latter case is explained by Cramer's Estate, supra, which says that the decision in
Matter of Bogert's Estate was based on a legal theory, whereas the right in question
is purely equitable. Charges of an attorney: Matter of Williams, 187 N. Y. 286, 79
N. E. 3O19 (19o7).
8. See GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 294.
9. Id. at 295: "It would appear to be more satisfactory for the courts to recognize frankly that recovery by the wife or child represents a limitation on the generality
of the spendthrift trust."
lo. This is in line with the continued Massachusetts policy to retain the spendthrift
trust with no exception. See Bucknam v. Bucknani, 200 N. E. 918 (Mass. 1936). The
reluctance to encroach upon this trust device is based on the courts' fear that its effect
will be nullified under a deluge of exceptions.
11. Instant case at 113.
12. Sec. 257 and comment f.
13. See Note, Spendthrift Trusts and Sound Policy (1911)

II COL. L. REV. 765.

The writer cites cases supporting his contention that creditors have no equity against
the trust estate and that creditors are not misled because the will creating the trust is
officially recorded.
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fault should bear considerable weight. 14 Furthermore, it is plain that although the testator intended to protect both the trustee-beneficiary and the
other beneficiaries," 5 it was certainly not his purpose to favor the dishonest
over the innocent." There is a vast difference between immunizing the
trust income from the claims of creditors and allowing the dishonesty or
incompetence of one beneficiary to decimate the shares of the others. It
is apparent that, in the ordinary case of this type, strict enforcement of
the spendthrift provision will lead to an inequitable result.'
Trusts-Power of Guardian to Exercise Option Clause in Insurance Policy-A life insurance policy stipulated that beneficiary, after
insured's death, could elect to have insurance company retain proceeds
of policy and pay monthly interest thereon in lieu of lump sum settlement.
Beneficiaries are infants and their guardian seeks to have company retain
money under option. Held (Lehman, J. dissenting), statutory restrictions limiting powers of guardian holding trust funds for investment' are
inapplicable because guardian is just exercising a vested contractual right,
in the nature of a property right.

Latterman et al. v. Guardian Life In-

2
surance Co. of America, 280 N. Y. O2, 19 N. E. (2d) 978 (1939).
Though the primary purpose of statutes restricting powers of guardians to invest trust funds I is to protect, safeguard, and prevent dissipation through improvident investment of the ward's property, courts have
generally failed to determine clearly what constitutes an investment,5

14. See GRIsWoLD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 362, where, after citing Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa. 276 (1879) (cited by the instant court), he says: "Although these decisions are perhaps logically justifiable in a spendthrift trust jurisdiction, there are
many reasons which would dictate a contrary result."
15. Note (1931) 36 DIcK. L. REV. 45, 50; (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REy. 480.
16. In re Burr's Estate, 143 Misc. 877, 257 N. Y. Supp. 654, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
where the court held-that a statute did not apply, saying: "It was not intended to protect a dishonest fiduciary in the retention of income otherwise payable to him from the
estate."
17. See the intermediary opinion in Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa. 276, 282 (1879):
"If the trustee may squander the shares of others and yet save his own, it will carry
the doctrine of spendthrift trusts beyond all our notions of equity and honesty, and
fasten upon the testator a special intent in favor of a faithless trustee, and in violation
of the same protection he intends for the benefit of the other objects of his bounty."
It is unfortunate that the instant court should be presented with such an important
question of policy under facts which must have swayed it in favor of the trusteebeneficiary, who was herself innocent and penniless. See note I supra.

i. N. Y. CONSoL LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1936) c. 14, § 85. "A guardian holding
trust funds for investment has the powers provided by section one hundred-eleven of the
decedent estate law for an executor or administrator, and must not invest the funds in
any other securities" (italics added).

N. Y. CONsoL. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1939) c. 13, § Ill. "An executor, administrator, trustee or other person holding trust funds for investment may invest the same
in the same kind of securities as those in which savings banks of this state are by law
authorized to invest the money deposited therein, and the income derived therefrom.
*
. ." For authorized securities for savings banks, see N. Y. CotsoL. LAws (Cahill,
Supp. 1938) c. 3, § 235.
2. Reversing 255 App. Div. 768, 7 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 573 (Ist Dep't, 1938), which
affirmed the lower court's decision.
3. For a complete list of such statutes, see 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935)
§§ 615-663; also Cum. Supp. (1938) §§ 615-663; Freifield, Investment of Trust Funds
(1931) 5 U. OF CN.L. Ray. i; Note, Statutory Specifications of Trustee's Investments
(1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 821, 822, n. 3.
4. In re Michaelson, 162 Misc. Rep. 847, 296 N. Y. Supp. 119 (Sup. Ct., King's
Co., 1937).
5. See New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, 54o, 6

N. E. 534, 537 (1886); State v. Gopher Tire and Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177
N. W. 937, 938 (1920); Drake v. Crane, 127 Mo. 85, io6, 29 S. W. 990, 994 (1895);
Appeal of Frankenfield, iI Weekly No. Cas. 373, 374 (Pa. 1882).

RECENT CASES

vaguely defining it as the "laying out of money in such manner that it
may produce a revenue". 8 The present decision seems to fall just outside
even those broad limits, for strictly speaking, there was no "laying out of
money" of the infant beneficiaries and, therefore, there was no investment
of those funds by the guardian. In presenting this argument the majority
of the court were compelled to stress a somewhat tenuous distinction between what constitutes such an investment under the statute and the exercise of a vested contractual right, describing the latter as a species of
property not subject to the statute.7 They thereby avoided. the difficulty
imposed by the rule that investments of trust funds in policies of life insurance are unauthorized in New. York State.8 Though obviously favorable to the infant beneficiaries, the argument not only fails to meet satisfactorily Lehman's protest that the direction to the company to retain
the money is in reality an investment of those funds,9 but also apparently
obtains no support either in the law '0 or in the courts 11 of that state. A
sounder, more logical decision would have conceded the main point of
Lehman's argument but also would have applied, instead of ignored, the
general rule that the trustee or guardian of illegal securities must reinvest them in legal ones within a reasonable time.'- The company could
have been directed to retain the proceeds of the policy, paying interest
thereon, until such time as would have -been necessary for guardian to
reinvest the same in authorized securities. 13 Thus the court would have
avoided the criticism of "judicial legislation" by leaving to the legislature ' 4 any advisable changes in the statute. 5
6. Una v. Dodd, 39 N. J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 173, 186 (1884) ; cf. State v. McFetridge,
84 Wisc. 473, 54 N. W. i (1893) (mere deposit of state funds in a bank not an invest-

ment by state treasurer) ; Estate of W. W. Law, i44 Pa. 499, 22 Atl. 831 (i8gi) (temporary deposit of trust funds by guardian at 3 per cent. interest not an investment) ;
Appeal of Frankenfield, ii Weekly No. Cas. 373, 374 (Pa. 1882) (loan of trust funds
by trustee to savings bank at 6 per cent. interest an investment).
7. See note i supra.
8. In re Vanderbilt, 129 Misc. Rep. 6o5, 223 N. Y. Supp. 314 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co..
1927); In the Matter of Rooney v. Weiner, 147 Misc. Rep. 48, 263 N. Y. Supp. 22
(Surr. Ct. Kings Co., 1933) ; In re Cohns' Estate, 158 Misc. Rep. 96, 285 N. Y. Supp.
279 (Surr. Ct. King's Co., 1936).
9. The learned judge, however, seems to weaken the force of his logic when he
argues that the assured had not indicated that if the beneficiaries should be infants at
the time the policy matures, their guardian should have the same choice as to investments as adult beneficiaries would have had. The direction to retain the funds and
pay monthly interest thereon being an investment and concededly illegeal under the statute, could such a provision in the policy of insurance make the otherwise illegal transaction legal, considering that the beneficiaries would still be infants?
io. See note i supra.
ii. It is interesting to note that the majority cite no precedent for their distinction.
12.

In re Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518,

121

Atl. 310 (923)

; In re Clark's Will, 257

N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (ig3i).
13. See note i supra.
14. In re Tollemache, [19o3] r Ch. 457, aff'd, [I9O3] I Ch. 955; see In re Muller's

Will, 155 Misc. Rep. 748, 28o N. Y. Supp. 345, 348 (1935).
x5. See note i supra. It is interesting to note here that only three states authorize
specifically by statute such investments of trust funds. i FLA. GEN. LAws (937) c.
17949, § i (j) ; Ky. STAT. ANN. (1934) c. 84- The General Assembly of Pennsylvania
previously sought to lead the way by passage of an act authorizing investment in life
insurance policies on petition to the orphans' court, but was blocked by a local conservative court which declared the act unconstitutional as violating art. III, § 22, of the
state constitution, which prohibited investment of trust funds with private corporations.
PA. CONST. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) art. III, § 22; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit.
20, § 804, Solomon's Petition, 77 PITTSBURGH L. J. 545, 43 YORK LEG. REC. 130 (0. C.
Allegheny Co., I929). For an excellent study of the more recent status of the law as
to investments by fiduciaries in Pennsylvania, see Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 6do.

